Artikel

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1475-679X ; Volume: 58 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 589-642 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Klassifikation
Management
Financial Crises
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Business and Securities Law
Economics of Regulation
Accounting and Auditing: General
Accounting
Accounting and Auditing: Government Policy and Regulation
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Thema
accounting regulation
fair value
financial crisis
ideology
political economy
accounting standard setting
stock option expensing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
BISCHOF, JANNIS
DASKE, HOLGER
SEXTROH, CHRISTOPH J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.1111/1475-679X.12300
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • BISCHOF, JANNIS
  • DASKE, HOLGER
  • SEXTROH, CHRISTOPH J.
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2020

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