Arbeitspapier

International climate agreements, cost reductions and convergence of Partisan politics

In recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have been leveled with respect to climate protection. We show that this partial convergence in party platforms can be explained by international climate agreements, effectively reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We set up a voting model in which political parties differ in their preferences for climate protection and in which (national) climate protection causes both resource costs and distortions in the international allocation of production. International agreements, which reduce greenhouse gas emissions, decrease effective abatement costs. This affects traditional parties in a different way than green parties, since a lower preference for climate protection implies a higher price (cost) elasticity of demand. Thus, climate agreements can lead to more political consensus within countries, even if politicians are partisans. We also point out that increasing flexibility and efficiency in abatement mechanisms is preferable to forming a climate coalition that focuses directly on emission reduction commitments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3591

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Public Goods
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
climate protection
political economy
green parties
platform convergence

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Laurency, Patrick
Schindler, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Laurency, Patrick
  • Schindler, Dirk
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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