Precommitted government spending and partisan politics

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3462

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Publicly Provided Goods: General
• Subject: government spending ; partisan politics ; political economy ; precommitment ; Öffentliche Ausgaben ; Regelgebundene Politik ; Parteipolitik ; Public Choice ; Staatsquote ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Watkins, William ; Bohn, Henning
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET