Arbeitspapier
Precommitted government spending and partisan politics
This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3462
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Publicly Provided Goods: General
- Thema
-
government spending
partisan politics
political economy
precommitment
Öffentliche Ausgaben
Regelgebundene Politik
Parteipolitik
Public Choice
Staatsquote
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Watkins, William
Bohn, Henning
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Watkins, William
- Bohn, Henning
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Intergenerational conflict, partisan politics, and public higher education spending: evidence from the German states
Partisan politics and public finance: changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955-1989
Government Spending and Durable Goods
Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending
Optimal Government Spending and Unemployment
Partisan politics and fiscal policy
Government Spending and the Taylor Principle
Government Spending Efficiency in Latin America
The Burden of Unanticipated Government Spending
Optimal Policy under Restricted Government Spending
Partisan politics in corporate tax competition
Output response to government spending: Evidence from new international military spending data
Intergenerational conflict, partisan politics, and public higher education spending: evidence from the German states
Partisan politics and public finance: changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955-1989
Government Spending and Durable Goods
Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending
Optimal Government Spending and Unemployment
Partisan politics and fiscal policy
Government Spending and the Taylor Principle
Government Spending Efficiency in Latin America
The Burden of Unanticipated Government Spending
Optimal Policy under Restricted Government Spending
Partisan politics in corporate tax competition
Output response to government spending: Evidence from new international military spending data
Intergenerational conflict, partisan politics, and public higher education spending: evidence from the German states
Partisan politics and public finance: changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955-1989
Government Spending and Durable Goods
Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending
Optimal Government Spending and Unemployment
Partisan politics and fiscal policy
Government Spending and the Taylor Principle
Government Spending Efficiency in Latin America
The Burden of Unanticipated Government Spending
Optimal Policy under Restricted Government Spending
Partisan politics in corporate tax competition