Arbeitspapier
Corrupted votes and rule compliance
Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which people distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less willing to comply with the rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes can impact economic behavior and sheds light on the behavioral mechanisms underlying "rule legitimacy".
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 137
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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rule compliance
endogenous institutions
corruption
procedural fairness
legitimacy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Apffelstaedt, Arno
Freundt, Jan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (where)
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Bonn and Cologne
- (when)
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2022
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Apffelstaedt, Arno
- Freundt, Jan
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Time of origin
- 2022