Arbeitspapier

Corrupted votes and rule compliance

Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which people distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less willing to comply with the rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes can impact economic behavior and sheds light on the behavioral mechanisms underlying "rule legitimacy".

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 137

Classification
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
rule compliance
endogenous institutions
corruption
procedural fairness
legitimacy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Apffelstaedt, Arno
Freundt, Jan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
(where)
Bonn and Cologne
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Apffelstaedt, Arno
  • Freundt, Jan
  • University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)

Time of origin

  • 2022

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