Arbeitspapier
Buying Votes and International Organizations
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 78
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Foreign Aid
- Thema
-
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dreher, Axel
Vreeland, James Raymond
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)
- (wo)
-
Göttingen
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Vreeland, James Raymond
- Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)
Entstanden
- 2011
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