Arbeitspapier

Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1275

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Subject
UN General Assembly
Voting
Bilateral Aid
Bilaterale Entwicklungshilfe
Amerikanisch
Internationale Politik
Wahlverhalten
Schätzung
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dreher, Axel
Nunnenkamp, Peter
Thiele, Rainer
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dreher, Axel
  • Nunnenkamp, Peter
  • Thiele, Rainer
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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