Buying Votes and International Organizations

Arbeitspapier

This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 78

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Foreign Aid
• Subject: IMF ; UN Security Council ; Voting ; Aid

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dreher, Axel ; Vreeland, James Raymond
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)
• (where): Göttingen
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90459
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET