Arbeitspapier
Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules
We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces compliance, but with high compliance there is incentive for lax monitoring; with less monitoring, compliance starts decreasing, and then there is an incentive to intensify monitoring. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is ex-plained by the nature of social interaction process rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. For the authority committed to a fixed auditing probability, we derive a sufficient condition for fines to be effective means of deterrence. Our analysis can be applied, among others, to crime, tax evasion, safety regulations, employment and environmental protection.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4767
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
social interaction
compliance
random matching
behavioral rule
learning
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lipatov, Vilen
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lipatov, Vilen
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014