Arbeitspapier

Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces compliance, but with high compliance there is incentive for lax monitoring; with less monitoring, compliance starts decreasing, and then there is an incentive to intensify monitoring. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is ex-plained by the nature of social interaction process rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. For the authority committed to a fixed auditing probability, we derive a sufficient condition for fines to be effective means of deterrence. Our analysis can be applied, among others, to crime, tax evasion, safety regulations, employment and environmental protection.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4767

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
social interaction
compliance
random matching
behavioral rule
learning

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lipatov, Vilen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lipatov, Vilen
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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