Arbeitspapier
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave "correctly".
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1048
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
advice effect
strategy-proofness
Vickrey auction
pay-your-bid auction
market design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Masuda, Takehito
Sakai, Toyataka
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Wakayama, Takuma
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Masuda, Takehito
- Sakai, Toyataka
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Wakayama, Takuma
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2019
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