The market for melons: Cournot competition with unobserval qualities

Arbeitspapier

Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two qualities are equal. When the quality differential is large, the firms' output levels are not always strategic substitutes. There can be no, or up to three pure-strategy equilibria. Yet, as long as the cost differential is not extreme, there always exists a stable duopolistic equilibrium. In that sense, strategic quantity-setting helps prevent market unraveling.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 617

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
• Thema: Cournot competition ; quality ; duopoly ; asymmetric information ; Nash equilibrium ; Duopol ; Wettbewerb ; Produktqualität ; Asymmetrische Information ; Nash-Gleichgewicht

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Argenton, Cédric
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56088
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ