Subsidizing Quantity Donations: Matches, Rebates, and Discounts Compared

Konferenzbeitrag

We present online-experimental evidence that challenges the generalizability of established results on subsidizing giving by considering a "quantity donation" scheme. We define this scheme as one in which donors choose how many units of a charitable good to fund, rather than the amount of money to give. We find that different subsidy types are equally effective in raising funds. This contrasts with the common result of matches being superior to rebates. The finding masks a higher likelihood of giving under rebates and larger donations under matches and discounts. Our results emphasize the role of small changes in the donation environment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Public Economics III ; No. C14-V1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Field Experiments ; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Public Goods ; Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
• Thema: Charitable giving ; subsidies ; online field experiment ; framing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Diederich, Johannes ; Eckel, Catherine C. ; Epperson, Raphael ; Goeschl, Timo ; Grossman, Philip J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel, Hamburg
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203650
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ