Subsidizing unit donations: Matches, rebates, and discounts compared

Arbeitspapier

An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to 'unit donation' schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors' choices are about the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: The three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregate level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: AWI Discussion Paper Series ; No. 697

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Field Experiments ; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Public Goods ; Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
• Subject: Charitable giving ; unit donation ; subsidies ; online field experiment ; framing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Diederich, Johannes ; Eckel, Catherine C. ; Epperson, Raphael ; Goeschl, Timo ; Grossman, Philip Johnson
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2020

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00029236
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235020
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-292365
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET