Arbeitspapier
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements with polluting industries are becoming a popular alternative to traditional environmental regulation. One reason may be that voluntary agreements can reduce compliance costs of polluting industries. In this paper we develop a family of simple policy formulation and implementation models enabling us to formally characterize the policy environments that make voluntary agreements possible. The main message of this paper is one of caution. Voluntary agreements that increase compliance costs and reduce social welfare cannot be ruled out. The analysis also suggests that giving the legislative branch of government an effective power of veto reduces (but does not eliminate) the possibility of welfare reducing voluntary agreements.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 23.1997
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Umweltpolitik
Selbstverpflichtung
Verhandlungen
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gêarn Hansen, Lars
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gêarn Hansen, Lars
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 1997
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Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: Negotiating emission reductions
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
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Asymmetric Innovation Agreements under Environmental Regulation
Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Protection - Experiences in Germany and Future Perspectives
Voluntary agreements and competition law
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