Arbeitspapier
Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 35
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
commitments
imperfect observability
subgame perfection
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Ritzberger, Klaus
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (where)
-
Vienna
- (when)
-
1996
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Kirchsteiger, Georg
- Ritzberger, Klaus
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Time of origin
- 1996
Other Objects (12)
Experimental game theory
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory: Back to square one?
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Experimental game theory
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory: Back to square one?
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Experimental game theory
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game
(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory: Back to square one?
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment