Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and potential stability of a number of coalitions which are potentially effective in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even potentially stable even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 97.2011

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Computable General Equilibrium Models ; Noncooperative Games ; Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: Climate Policy ; Climate Coalition ; Game Theory ; Free Riding ; Klimaveränderung ; Umweltabkommen ; Kooperation ; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Theorie ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bosetti, Valentina ; Carraro, Carlo ; De Cian, Enrica ; Massetti, Emanuele ; Tavoni, Massimo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59715
• Last update: 2025-03-10T11:44:53+0100