Arbeitspapier
On the incentives to form strategic coalitions in ATM markets
This paper studies ATM coalitions in retail banking. We ask when it is profitable for banks to make agreements which ban direct ATM transaction fees. In the case of a coalition banks loose income from ATM transactions but relax competition in the banking market. We find that such agreements are profitable when the interchange fee is sufficiently high. When banks can collude on the interchange they always form a coalition. Coalitions may harm consumers but lead to higher total welfare. Moreover, we find that smaller banks have larger incentives to form ATM coalitions. Investment in ATM networks is typically higher with a coalition.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IWQW Discussion Papers ; No. 05/2008
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Banking competition
ATM networks
collusion
Bankautomation
Business Network
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Bank
Koalition
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Wenzel, Tobias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW)
- (wo)
-
Nürnberg
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wenzel, Tobias
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW)
Entstanden
- 2008
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