Arbeitspapier

Unemployment insurance in welfare states: Soft constraints and mild sanctions

Based on a sequence of reforms in the Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI) system, we show that activity-oriented UI regimes - i.e., regimes with a high likelihood of required participa-tion in active labor market programs, duration limitations on unconditional UI entitlements, and high sanction probabilities - deliver substantially shorter unemployment spells than pure income-insurance regimes. Soft constraints, in the form of activity requirements or small benefit cuts af-ter a pre-specified UI duration, have many of the same behavioral consequences as threats of complete benefit termination. Early introduction of a soft constraint appears particularly effec-tive; our results show that the expected unemployment duration falls by half a day for each week the soft constraint is moved ahead in the UI spell. Mild sanctions, in the form of temporary bene-fit terminations in response to inadequate search effort or excess choosiness, cause a significant rise in the job hazard.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2007,13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
Statistical Simulation Methods: General
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Thema
Competing risks
unemployment insurance
timing-of-events
NPMLE
MMPH
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitslosigkeit
Dauer
Norwegen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Røed, Knud
Westlie, Lars
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Røed, Knud
  • Westlie, Lars
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)