Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002:21

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
• Thema: Unemployment insurance ; search ; sanctions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Boone, Jan ; Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil ; van Ours, Jan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82222
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ