On Hierarchies and Communication

Arbeitspapier

Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-056/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
• Subject: communication ; hierarchy ; cooperative game ; feasible set ; Hierarchie ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Transferable Utility Games ; Kooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): van den Brink, René
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86193
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET