Arbeitspapier
Conditional dominance in games with unawareness
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensiveform game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist of a collection of normal-form games. We use it to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by iterative conditional strict (resp. weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal-form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for generalized normal-form games is not independent of the extensive-form structure. This is because under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes he considers possible but also of which game tree(s) he is aware of.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 351
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Awareness
unknown unknowns
extensive-form games
normal-form games
extensive-form rationalizability
prudent rationalizability
iterated conditional dominance
iterated admissibility
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Meier, Martin
- Schipper, Burkhard
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2022
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