Arbeitspapier

Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategyproofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges his object, he pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment which is identical for all agents) independently of which object he consumes. Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents' valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
Fixed Tax
Exchanges
Top Trading

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andersson, Tommy
Ehlers, Lars
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Tierney, Ryan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andersson, Tommy
  • Ehlers, Lars
  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
  • Tierney, Ryan
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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