Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

Arbeitspapier

We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategyproofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges his object, he pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment which is identical for all agents) independently of which object he consumes. Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents' valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:17

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Fixed Tax ; Exchanges ; Top Trading

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar ; Tierney, Ryan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260246
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET