- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games; ISSN: 2073-4336; Volume: 1; Year: 2010; Issue: 3; Pages: 168-188
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
epistemic game theory
backward induction
forward induction
algorithms
epistemic game theory
backward induction
forward induction
algorithms
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Perea, Andres
Basel: MDPI
Basel: MDPI
Erschienen
Basel: MDPI
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:57 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Perea, Andres
- Basel: MDPI
Entstanden
- Basel: MDPI
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