Parabolic Cylinders and Folk Theorems

Arbeitspapier

We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the infinite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on infinite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1043

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2015

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4415
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159881
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET