Arbeitspapier
Majority voting leads to unanimity
We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions under which the winners wish to compensate all losers, thus leading to unanimity for reform, rather than compensating some losers to form a non-maximal majority. The analysis employs concepts from cooperative game theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2005,02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
voting
reform
status quo
Kaldor-Hicks sense
chosen alternative
unanimity for reform
cooperative game theory
Wahlsystem
Kooperatives Spiel
Kaldor-Hicks Kriterium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asheim, Geir B.
Claussen, Carl Andreas
Nilssen, Tore
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Asheim, Geir B.
- Claussen, Carl Andreas
- Nilssen, Tore
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2005
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