Arbeitspapier
Budget deficit, size of the public sector and majority voting
In this paper Tabellini's and Alesina's (1990) median voter model for the explanation of budget deficits is modified by endogenizing the private sector. Debt finance is supplemented by taxing a private consumption which serves as an additional source of revenue for funding the public sector. The introduction of the private sector enables us to explain the budget balance as a result of political polarization with a left-wing party and a right-wing party having different preferences for the size of the public sector.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 120-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Budget; Budget Systems
National Deficit; Surplus
- Thema
-
Haushaltsdefizit
Finanzpolitik
Staatsquote
Median Voter
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Siebel, Jens
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
- (wo)
-
Siegen
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Siebel, Jens
- Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Entstanden
- 2005
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