Arbeitspapier

Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting

I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b < 1/2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the first ballot all voting winners, i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may benefit both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in the sphere of communal politics.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 09/115

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
voting
minority
communal politics
Abstimmungsregel
Politische Entscheidung
Kommunalpolitik
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fahrenberger, Theresa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005868910
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fahrenberger, Theresa
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Time of origin

  • 2009

Other Objects (12)