Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting

Arbeitspapier

I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b < 1/2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the first ballot all voting winners, i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may benefit both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in the sphere of communal politics.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 09/115

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: voting ; minority ; communal politics ; Abstimmungsregel ; Politische Entscheidung ; Kommunalpolitik ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fahrenberger, Theresa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005868910
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171558
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ