Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The numerical analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005:13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
• Thema: Unemployment insurance ; search equilibrium ; time limits ; monitoring and sanctions ; workfare ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Aktivierende Sozialhilfe ; Arbeitsuche ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78703
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ