Artikel
Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring
I model job-search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job-search effort is the worker's private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one-period model with two effort levels, I show analytically that the monitoring precision increases and the utility spread decreases if and only if the inverse of the worker's utility in consumption has a convex derivative. The quantitative analysis that follows extends the model by allowing a continuous effort and separations from employment. That analysis highlights two conflicting economic forces affecting the optimal precision of monitoring with respect to the generosity of the welfare system: higher promised utility is associated not only with a higher cost of moral hazard, but also with lower effort and lower value of employment. The result is an inverse U-shaped precision profile with respect to promised utility
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 693-733 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Thema
-
Unemployment insurance
optimal contracts
moral hazard
jobsearch monitoring
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Setty, Ofer
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/QE564
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Setty, Ofer
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2019
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