Arbeitspapier

Mediated truth

Many facts are learned through the intermediation of individuals with special access to information, such as law enforcement officers, employees with a security clearance, or experts with specific knowledge. This paper considers whether societies can learn about such facts when information is costly to acquire, cheap to manipulate, and produced sequentially. The answer is negative under an "asymptotic scarcity" condition pertaining to the amount of evidence available which distinguishes, for example, between reproducible scientific evidence and the evidence generated by a crime.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0140

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
law enforcement
herding
social learning
investigation
ethical agent
monitoring

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Strulovici, Bruno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Strulovici, Bruno
  • Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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