Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Arbeitspapier

In recent years Open Innovation (OI) processes have been receiving growing attention from the empirical and theoretical economic literature, where a debate is taking place on the aspects of complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and OI spillover. By means of a differential game approach, we analyze the case of substitutability in an OI setup in a Cournot duopoly where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival. The technical analysis and the numerical simulations point out that the firm which commits to a higher level of OI absorption produces a smaller output and enjoys higher profits than its rival.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-110-6
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 111

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: R&D ; spillovers ; dynamic games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hasnas, Irina ; Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83954
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ