Arbeitspapier
Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations
Numerous laboratory experiments show that workers reciprocate to high wages with high effort, when there is perfect information on the surplus created. Recent field experiments, however, suggest that trust and reciprocity may be lower or absent when the information is incomplete. We report a laboratory experiment with symmetric and asymmetric incomplete surplus information in a “bilateral gift exchange” setting. We find that trust and reciprocity have a significant positive effect on wages, effort and efficiency. But, all three are substantially lower under incomplete than under complete information. The negative impact on wages and efficiency is even greater with information asymmetry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 24/2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
trust
reciprocity
efficiency
incomplete information
asymmetric information
Arbeitsbeziehungen
Leistungsmotivation
Agency Theory
Spieltheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Asymmetrische Information
Vertrauen
Gerechtigkeit
Theorie
reciprocity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Rockenbach, Bettina
Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
- Rockenbach, Bettina
- Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2003
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