Arbeitspapier

Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1092

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Monetary Policy
Thema
Asymmetric information
Imperfect credibility
Signal extraction
Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
Geldpolitik
Zentralbank
Asymmetrische Information
Unvollkommene Information
Volatilität
Bruttoinlandsprodukt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carboni, Giacomo
Ellison, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carboni, Giacomo
  • Ellison, Martin
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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