Arbeitspapier
Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information
The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility.
- Sprache
- 
                Englisch
 
- Erschienen in
- 
                Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1092
 
- Klassifikation
- 
                Wirtschaft
 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
 Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
 Monetary Policy
 
- Thema
- 
                Asymmetric information
 Imperfect credibility
 Signal extraction
 Dynamisches Gleichgewicht
 Geldpolitik
 Zentralbank
 Asymmetrische Information
 Unvollkommene Information
 Volatilität
 Bruttoinlandsprodukt
 Theorie
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Carboni, Giacomo
 Ellison, Martin
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (wer)
- 
                European Central Bank (ECB)
 
- (wo)
- 
                Frankfurt a. M.
 
- (wann)
- 
                2009
 
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carboni, Giacomo
- Ellison, Martin
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2009
