Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 19-032

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: knowledge diffusion ; information sharing ; reciprocity ; conversation ; experimental economics ; centipede game

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ganglmair, Bernhard ; Holcomb, Alex ; Myung, Noah
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202332
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET