Arbeitspapier
Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 19-032
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
knowledge diffusion
information sharing
reciprocity
conversation
experimental economics
centipede game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ganglmair, Bernhard
Holcomb, Alex
Myung, Noah
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ganglmair, Bernhard
- Holcomb, Alex
- Myung, Noah
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2019
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