Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1432-0479
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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online resource.
- Erschienen in
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Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information ; day:29 ; month:5 ; year:2019 ; pages:1-25
Economic theory ; (29.5.2019), 1-25
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s00199-019-01201-y
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2019120417162198943360
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:56 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Flesch, János
- Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques
- Maes, Jasmine
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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