Arbeitspapier
The strategy of manipulating conflict
Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-06
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
global strategy
Politischer Konflikt
Politische Gewalt
Signalling
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Baliga, Sandeep
Sjostrom, Tomas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Baliga, Sandeep
- Sjostrom, Tomas
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2009
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