Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate information. We show that unbiased advisers put highest effort in collecting information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences of the policy maker and the adviser be aligned. Therefore, policy makers appoint advisers with preferences that are less extreme than their own.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-052/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Politikberatung ; Manipulation ; Theorie ; Politische Entscheidung

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dur, Robert A.J. ; Swank, Otto H.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85897
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET