Konferenzbeitrag
On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts
What is the optimal size of expert committees? To address this question, I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns. Each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world and is unsure about the argument s soundness. Experts may remain silent or compete for the opportunity to announce an argument. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees. This effect is sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Organization Theory: Committees and Corruption ; No. E19-V3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hahn, Volker
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (when)
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2012
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Hahn, Volker
Time of origin
- 2012