Arbeitspapier

Over-caution of large committees of experts

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the world. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. No matter how small the disesteem payoffs are, information aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-313

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Committees
Information aggregation
Disesteem payoffs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Midjord, Rune
Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás
Valasek, Justin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Midjord, Rune
  • Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás
  • Valasek, Justin
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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