Arbeitspapier
Over-caution of large committees of experts
We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the world. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. No matter how small the disesteem payoffs are, information aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2013-313
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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Committees
Information aggregation
Disesteem payoffs
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Midjord, Rune
Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás
Valasek, Justin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
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2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Midjord, Rune
- Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás
- Valasek, Justin
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2013