Arbeitspapier
Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation
A rich person who fears a loss of income may later favor redistributive taxation and a mix of taxes and public goods that differs from the one he now favors. If mobility is costly, and if government in each period uses majority voting to determine policy, then this person may prefer to live in a community that is permanently ruled by poor residents. Majority voting is a mechanism that can overcome intertemporal commitment problems of income insurance.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 190
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Glazer, Amihai
Konrad, Kai A.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Konstanz
- (when)
-
1992
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Glazer, Amihai
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 1992
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