Arbeitspapier

Size and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 172

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
bailouts
soft-budget constraints
jurisdictional size
public goods
spillovers

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Crivelli, Ernesto
Staal, Klaas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13379
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13379-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Crivelli, Ernesto
  • Staal, Klaas
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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