Selection Wages and Discrimination

Arbeitspapier

Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2009-14

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Feminist Economics ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
• Subject: Discrimination ; selection wages ; efficiency wages ; hiring standards ; monopsony ; employment criteria ; wage posting ; Reder competition ; social roles ; social stereotypes ; social multiplier ; statistical discrimination ; taste discrimination ; Arbeitsnachfrage ; Lohnstruktur ; Lohnstruktur ; Effizienzlohn ; Monopson ; Männer ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schlicht, Ekkehart
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): München
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.10990
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104288
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10990-1
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET