Arbeitspapier

Adopting price-level targeting under imperfect credibility in ToTEM

Using the Bank of Canada's main projection and policy-analysis model, ToTEM, this paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Following the policy change, private agents assign a probability to the event that the policy-maker will revert to inflation-targeting next period. As this probability decreases and imperfect credibility abates, inflation expectations in the economy become consistent with price-level targeting. The paper finds a large welfare gain when imperfect credibility is short-lived. The gain becomes smaller with persisting imperfect credibility, turning to a loss if it lasts more than 13 years.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2009-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Monetary Policy
Thema
Monetary policy framework
Monetary policy implementation
Geldpolitik
Inflation Targeting
Preisniveaustabilität
Unvollkommene Information
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Kanada

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cateau, Gino
Kryvtsov, Oleksiy
Shukayev, Malik
Ueberfeldt, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2009

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2009-17
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cateau, Gino
  • Kryvtsov, Oleksiy
  • Shukayev, Malik
  • Ueberfeldt, Alexander
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2009

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