Arbeitspapier

Inflation targeting and liquidity traps under endogenous credibility

Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations. We find that the region of allowed policy parameters is strictly larger than under rational expectations. However, when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is accounted for, self-fulfilling deflationary spirals can occur, depending on the credibility of the central bank. Deflationary spirals can be prevented with a high inflation target and aggressive monetary easing.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-9

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Subject
Business fluctuations and cycles
Credibility
Monetary policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hommes, Cars H.
Lustenhouwer, Joep
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2019-9
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hommes, Cars H.
  • Lustenhouwer, Joep
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2019

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