Arbeitspapier
Inflation targeting and liquidity traps under endogenous credibility
Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations. We find that the region of allowed policy parameters is strictly larger than under rational expectations. However, when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is accounted for, self-fulfilling deflationary spirals can occur, depending on the credibility of the central bank. Deflationary spirals can be prevented with a high inflation target and aggressive monetary easing.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-9
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- Subject
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Business fluctuations and cycles
Credibility
Monetary policy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hommes, Cars H.
Lustenhouwer, Joep
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bank of Canada
- (where)
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Ottawa
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/swp-2019-9
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hommes, Cars H.
- Lustenhouwer, Joep
- Bank of Canada
Time of origin
- 2019