Arbeitspapier

Adopting price-level targeting under imperfect credibility: An update

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to pricelevel targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2008-37

Classification
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Monetary Policy
Subject
Credibility
Monetary policy framework
Geldpolitisches Ziel
Zentralbank
Inflation Targeting
Preisniveau
Glaubwürdigkeit
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kryvtsov, Oleksiy
Shukayev, Malik
Ueberfeldt, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2008-37
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kryvtsov, Oleksiy
  • Shukayev, Malik
  • Ueberfeldt, Alexander
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2008

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