Arbeitspapier
Precluding collusion in the Vickrey auction
This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders´ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2014/10
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Subject
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Bidder collusion
detail-free auctions
Vickrey auction
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gorelkina, Olga
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gorelkina, Olga
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2014
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