The influence of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel cases

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1004

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General
• Thema: Cartel detection ; collusion ; competition policy ; Kartell ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Preisabsprache ; Statistischer Test ; Momentenmethode ; Schätzung ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): von Blanckenburg, Korbinian ; Geist, Alexander ; Kholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36727
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ