The influence of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel cases

Konferenzbeitrag

In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization ; No. G9-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Thema: cartel detection ; collusion ; competition policy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): von Blanckenburg, Korbinian ; Geist, Alexander ; Kholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ